Why Sudan matters more to Riyadh

17 September 2026

Saudi Arabia is deepening its involvement in Sudan in 2026, expanding its engagement beyond mediation efforts to include military support, political outreach and a growing focus on Sudan’s strategic position on the Red Sea. According to analysts and diplomatic sources, Riyadh’s approach is increasingly shaped by two interconnected interests: influencing the political settlement that emerges from Sudan’s war and strengthening its regional security position as the Houthi threat in Yemen continues to reshape the Red Sea. 

The Saudi approach has become more visible through its engagement with both Sudan’s military leadership and civilian political forces. Riyadh has continued to maintain close relations with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan while also hosting senior civilian figures, including Mariam al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, al-Sadiq al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, Babiker Faisal, Omar al-Digair and Abdelwahid Mohamed Nur, as well as other civilian and Umma Party figures, according to several Sudanese civilian and diplomatic sources speaking to Ayin. The outreach reflects an effort to bring civilian actors into discussions around a political settlement that supports the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). 

At the same time, Saudi Arabia has been linked to efforts to strengthen the SAF militarily, including reported support for Pakistani weapons. This combination of military and political engagement marks an important evolution in Riyadh’s Sudan policy; rather than relying exclusively on the military to shape the outcome of the war, Saudi Arabia appears increasingly interested in influencing both the military balance and the political architecture that follows it. 

A civilian political settlement

Saudi Arabia’s expanding civilian engagement comes as Riyadh appears to have concluded that its relationship with the army alone cannot secure its interests in Sudan. The Kingdom has been seeking to support a political process that includes civilian forces while maintaining Burhan as an important interlocutor. 

Kholood Khair, a founding director at Confluence Advisory, said the shift reflects a recognition in Riyadh that military power alone cannot determine Sudan’s future. 

“I think what the Saudi engagement shows is that the Saudis have learned that a military victory, which is what they are pursuing through the SAF by giving them weapons, including Pakistani weapons and everything else, is not enough,” Khair told Ayin. It is a lesson they have seen in Syria and now with Yemen, Khair added. “You cannot just have a military actor anymore, especially in a country like Sudan that has had a revolution – you have to have a civilian element in that government. So that’s a significant shift in the Saudi perspective on Sudan.”

This thinking is reflected in the emerging framework outlined publicly by Faris al-Nur, who defected from the RSF through a Saudi initiative and this week published an article in a Saudi newspaper setting out a seven-year transitional settlement for Sudan. 

The proposal envisages that the army would gradually leave politics, administration, and the economy while holding a limited role in a presidential system. A civilian administration would run the executive, economic, services, and rebuilding, while the RSF and other armed movements would be integrated, demobilised, and rehabilitated into a professional army.

The framework also suggests that Islamist forces leave the state’s “deep state” and cut ties with official institutions and the military but keep their political rights. It demands safeguards for war-torn regions, no collective punishment or political persecution, responsibility for proved crimes, and a five-year constitutional cycle following the transition until elections are the only way to power.

I think that the fault in their logic is that someone like Burhan, who did a coup against the civilian government, can now be trusted to create a civilian government himself

–Kholood Khair, Confluence Advisory, Director

Sudanese civilian figures and diplomatic sources told Ayin that the framework outlined by al-Nur broadly aligns with the proposals and ideas they had been briefed on by Saudi officials during discussions on their initiative. Abdelwahid al-Nur, however, has rejected the Saudi initiative, citing concerns over the continued influence of Islamists within the army. 

The central problem, according to Khair, is whether an institution that has repeatedly intervened in Sudanese politics can credibly oversee a transition toward civilian rule. “I think that the fault in their logic is that someone like Burhan that did a coup against the civilian government can now be trusted to create a civilian government himself. And when the time is right, after seven years, according to Faris al-Nur, someone like Burhan would step aside to allow for a civilian government to take shape. That is the major fault in their logic. That is a major fault in their plan.”

Saudi Arabia’s interest in Sudan also appears to have expanded beyond the immediate question of ending the war. The Kingdom increasingly views Sudan through the lens of its own regional security, especially vis-à-vis the Red Sea coastline.

Yemen changes the calculation

The intensification of the Houthi conflict in Yemen has added a new dimension to Saudi Arabia’s Sudan policy. Sudan’s coastline runs along one of the most strategically important maritime corridors in the world, opposite the western coast of Saudi Arabia and close to the wider Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb security environment.

The deterioration of the security situation around the Red Sea means Sudan’s military and maritime capabilities have become more relevant to Riyadh, a diplomatic source told Ayin. The SAF has increasingly sought to demonstrate that it can police Sudanese territorial waters, including through the reported interception of a suspected weapons-smuggling vessel and the projection of Sudanese maritime forces as capable security partners.

For Saudi Arabia, the situation creates an incentive to maintain a strong relationship with the SAF even while pushing for a political settlement. The SAF’s usefulness is no longer confined to the Sudanese battlefield: its control of Port Sudan and access to the Red Sea potentially give it a role in a broader regional security architecture.

Khair said Sudan’s strategic importance to Riyadh has increased substantially and is now closely connected to Yemen. “Sudan occupies a much higher priority for Riyadh than it did before the Iran war.”

The changing role of the RSF in Yemen could further reshape Saudi calculations. The RSF reportedly plans to withdraw from the Saudi-led coalition, removing a Sudanese force that had previously provided manpower to Saudi Arabia’s Yemen campaign. That creates a question over whether Riyadh will seek the RSF’s return to Yemen or develop alternative security relationships.