Sudan Conflict Monitor #22

21 August 2025

The Sudan Conflict Monitor is a rapid response to the war in Sudan written through a peacebuilding, human rights, and justice lens, reflecting on the most important stories in the country. Please share it widely.

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In this issue:

1. Security Developments

Burhan’s Military Reshuffle

On August 18, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan announced a series of military reshuffles, including the retirement of five lieutenant generals, 23 major generals, and 58 brigadiers, alongside a decree bringing Sudan’s “auxiliary forces” under the 2007 Armed Forces Act. The moves, presented as efforts to strengthen discipline, coincided with Burhan’s meeting in Geneva with a senior U.S. adviser, raising speculation over international pressure.

The retirements targeted officers tied to the Islamist movement, several of whom were directly implicated in the June 3, 2019 massacre of peaceful protesters participating in a sit-in, manufacturing crisis after crisis to destabilize the civilian transitional cabinet led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and in igniting the current war and obstructing efforts to end it through a negotiated settlement. Presented by some as a step towards reform, the Sudanese are sceptical as they see that genuine reform would require more effort in uprooting Islamist influence in the military. Observers note that reshuffles and promotions alone cannot address decades of politicization, factionalism, and war that have eroded the army’s structure and doctrine.

Burhan also ordered all auxiliary forces to be governed by SAF’s 2007 Act and subordinated them to local army commanders to “strengthen command and control.” This is a welcome step—yet it comes 28 months into the war and amounts to an admission that for over two years, units like the Jihadist Al-Baraa Ibn Malik, the Islamist-dominated GIS “Special Forces,” and warlord Abu Aqla Keikal’s Sudan Shield militia operated alongside the SAF, and dozens more with only loose oversight.

The decision highlights core challenges posed by SAF’s systematic policy of using militias as proxies in the war against the RSF. Groups such as these are not conventional units but irregular ideologically, ethnically, or regionally based formations deployed alongside the SAF and loosely coordinating with its command but operating under their own command chains and often autonomously. These chaotic command structures have led to serious military setbacks, particularly in the ongoing offensives in Kordofan as detailed below. They have also encouraged human rights abuses, as such structures lack the command-and-control structures to prevent them.

Bringing them under formal command is more symbolic than practical unless coupled with dissolution of militias, outlawing of membership, and rebuilding of the army on professional, national foundations. Without these steps, Burhan’s reshuffle risks being remembered as a tactical gesture rather than the start of genuine military reform.

Burhan does not decree the integration of auxiliary forces within the SAF as such integration would require the full deployment of security arrangements, including DDR measures, and provisions for accompanying civilian oversight, accountability mechanisms, and protections for rights. It remains to be seen whether this declaration will lead to real change on the ground.

El Fasher remains under siege

El Fasher remains under siege by the RSF, which has repeatedly attempted to overrun SAF and Allied Forces’ defenses. SAF and allies repelled a renewed RSF offensive on July 16 and  another assault on August 3. The largest of RSF attacks occurred on August 10 and was again repelled. The RSF continues to shell the city daily and to block commercial and humanitarian supplies from reaching it, with civilians and facilities necessary for their survival and wellbeing bearing the brunt of the indiscriminate shelling.   

Hadi Idris, the Tasis-appointed governor of the Darfur region, has called for the evacuation of the city, a move which has been rejected by the SAF-aligned state governor, Al-Hafiz Bakhi, who says that the areas to which evacuation is proposed, the towns of Korma and Tawila, are unsafe and calls the move a “cheap propaganda to recruit young men.”

On August 11, an RSF attack on Abu Shouk IDP camp killed at least 40 civilians, who were either intentionally killed or hit with stray bullets, according to local emergency response rooms. The attack was condemned by the UN Resident Coordinator in Sudan, Sheldon Yett.

The RSF left only a narrow corridor to escape the city. Attempts to flee are costly, as those fleeing risk loss of all their belongings on the way, and those suspected for any reason of affiliation with the Darfuri rebel movements allied with the SAF are at risk of arbitrary arrest and indiscriminate killing, despite the assurances of safe passage for civilians given by the Tasis leadership. Emergency Lawyers, a human rights group, reported that RSF forces killed at least 14 people who were trying to escape in early August.

Although SAF and Joint Forces continue to hold the city, the siege is causing significant suffering. The RSF blockade of humanitarian aid is leaving the population in dire need. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) has announced that the city has reached IPC Phase 5 – full-blown famine. With food selling at five times the national average, people are resorting to eating animal feed locally known as ombaz, the residue left after extracting oil from sesame and groundnut seeds, and supplies of even this are running low. ACJPS reported that at least two children have died of malnutrition each day since July 25.

Urgent action is needed to protect the estimated 740,000 civilians remaining in the city.

Fighting intensifies in Kordofan

Fighting has intensified in Kordofan, which has become a key strategic focus for both sides. The RSF needs control if it is to threaten Central Sudan again and to interdict the movement of products from its areas to markets in SAF-controlled areas from which they can be exported. For its part, SAF needs control if it is to defend its besieged divisions in El Obeid and Babanoussa, and to establish a springboard to challenge the RSF’s stronghold in Darfur. The region is also home to much of Sudan’s oil and a key transit point for oil from South Sudan.

The RSF controls most of West Kordofan, while the SAF controls the eastern part of West and South Kordofan states, including the capital of North Kordofan, El Obeid, which is under siege by the RSF. Recent RSF actions appear focused on completely closing off the city. From the north, RSF has closed in on Bara, only 55 km from the capital, from the West, they attacked Umm Sumeima, just 70 kilometres away, and the northern incursions in Kazgeil and Al Debeibat threaten to encircle the city completely. The RSF repelled a SAF offensive in North Kordofan in the last week of July. SAF forces from Khartoum and White Nile states attacked RSF positions in and around Rahaid Al-Nuba, aiming to expand toward Umm Sayyala and Jabra El Sheikh. The RSF repelled the offensive and launched a counterattack. SAF and the allied Islamist and Sudan Shield Forces reported significant losses, including top commanders and hundreds of soldiers.

The RSF has an advantage in the region of West Kordofan, drawing most of its fighters from the local Misseriya ethnic group, who view this as a battle for their homeland. In addition, airstrikes and their civilian toll have helped to turn the population against the government.

SAF amassed large numbers of troops in Kordofan, consisting of different units, each reportedly with its own chain of command, while loosely coordinating operations with SAF’s general command. The allied forces include pro-jihadist groups that deployed fighters there, the former Joint Forces (Darfur armed movements), the “Special Forces” of the General Intelligence Services, and the freshly mobilized Sudan Shield Forces led by the warlord Abu Agala Keikal, who aided the RSF in conquering Elgezira state, before defecting, or returning by some accounts, to the SAF.

The Kordofan front has settled into a stalemate, punctuated by sporadic large-scale battles that inflict heavy losses on both sides. While agreeing on nothing else, both belligerents have consistently targeted civilians in areas under their rival’s control. The fighting has thus taken a significant toll on civilians, who have been targeted by both sides. SAF airstrikes have killed more than 34 civilians, and the death toll from RSF indiscriminate attacks in the Bara region was at least 60, and likely as high as 450. In early August, 16 civilians were reportedly killed in an RSF attack on the village of Markaz Al Ziyadiya in North Kordofan. Humanitarian agencies report that they are unable to access much of the region.

An alliance is born

In late June, aspiring warlord Mohamed Seid Ahmed Sir El Khatim, known as “Al Jakomi,” confirmed on Al Jazeera Mubasher that he planned to raise a 50,000-strong “Elite Sudan Defence Force” from Sudan’s Northern and River Nile states and send them to Eritrea for military training. He claimed that Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki consented to the plan while conceding that he had merely notified the SAF and GIS. If implemented, this would add to the growing number of ethnic and regional militias in SAF-held areas professing loyalty to the SAF. Still, they essentially serve the personal ambitions of their leaders. The initiative appears driven by Al Jakomi’s frustration at failing to secure a ministerial post in Idriss’s cabinet.

Al Jakomi gained notoriety in 2020 when he travelled to Juba during the peace talks between Sudan’s transitional government and the Sudan Revolutionary Front—a loose alliance of Darfur armed movements and the SPLM-N Malik Agar faction—where he claimed a seat at the table as the only known representative of the previously non-existent “Northern Track,” alongside the equally controversial Central and Eastern Tracks. The alliance of the Darfur Movements and SPLM-Agar armed movements integrated the “regional tracks,” none of which was at war with the central government, to increase the Alliance’s share in the division of spoils of power and wealth under the resulting 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA).

On July 30, Al Jakomi’s yet-to-be-formed “Sudan Defence Forces” formally allied with Abu Agla Keikal’s Sudan Shield Forces. According to their founding document, the new entity aims to defend the interests of constituencies in northern and central Sudan, which it claims have been politically side-lined within the Port Sudan power structures. Kaikal and Al Jakomi’s alliance appears to abandon the JPA’s Central and Northern Sudan “tracks” in favour of a political-military pact aimed at advancing their claims of entitlement to government positions as representatives of the two regions. Whether this manoeuvring will yield any tangible benefit for the people of northern and central Sudan remains highly doubtful.

In mid-August, Al Jakomi met with President Isayas Afwerki’s in the Eritrean capital Asmara. This encounter offers further proof of Eritrean increasing involvement in Sudan’s war, including reckless initiatives such as the training and arming of pro-SAF ethnic and regional militias as discussed in a recent STP briefing paper. 

Al Jakomi also reportedly met with visiting Salah Gosh, of ill fame as the former director of the Bashir regime’s NISS, and a prominent Islamist who continues to fuel the ongoing war propaganda with social media postings from his voluntary exile in Egypt. The latter meeting revealed added layers of intrigues around Al Jakomi’s gambit. The report alleges that Gosh persuaded Al Jakomi to abandon the regional organization of the new force and label it as a national civilian force with military training set up as a reserve for the SAF. Indeed, Al-Jakomi formally launched the new force on August 18.

Salah Gosh’s mid-August visit to Asmara was his second, both reportedly in a mission to further the intelligence coordination between Egypt and Eritrea in confronting Ethiopian interests.

2. Political developments

Kamil Idriss assembles his cabinet, but concerns persist

Appointed on May 31 with a pledge to form a technocratic cabinet of 22 non-partisan ministers, Prime Minister Kamil Idriss has yet to fill the portfolios of Health, Animal and Fisheries Wealth, and Environment. His initial commitment to neutrality quickly faltered, as several prominent experts he approached declined to serve, citing the reputational risks of joining a coup-backed government.

Appointments to several other ministries have drawn criticism for their links to the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and Sudan’s Islamist Movement—the real power behind the Bashir regime—raising fears of that regime’s return. For example, Mahassen Ali Yacoub, the new Minister of Trade and Industry, held the same position in the post-coup cabinet of October 2021, while Abdall Mohamed Daraf, Minister of Justice, has long been known for his Islamist affiliations dating back to his student days.

As noted in the July issue of Sudan Conflict Monitor, the most significant obstacle delaying cabinet formation was the insistence of Darfur’s armed movements, allied with the SAF in the ongoing war, to retain the same portfolios they held under the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement. They not only blocked Idriss’s attempts to nominate candidates from their ranks, but also imposed their own appointees. The deadlock was reportedly broken only after Gen. Burhan’s intervention, which forced Idriss to concede to their terms.

As a result, the commanders of the Joint Forces maintained their positions: Gibril Ibrahim of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) continues as Finance Minister, while Mini Minawi of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) remains governor of Darfur. In addition, they secured appointments for close aides: Moatasem Ahmed Saleh Adam JEM) as Minister of Human Resources and Social Welfare, and Nureldayem Taha (SLM-Minawi) as Minister of Minerals.

Under the same arrangement, Saif al-Nasr al-Tijani Haroun Jaber of the Sudan Liberation Forces Gathering was named Minister of Infrastructure and Transport. This accommodation is especially significant, as these ministries—Finance, Minerals, and Infrastructure—are central to the control of government revenues.

The cabinet formation process highlights the weakness of Idriss’s authority and the extent to which decision-making is shaped by the military leadership and its wartime allies. The dominance of Darfur’s armed movements in revenue-generating ministries entrenches a war economy logic, where cabinet portfolios are treated as entitlements rather than instruments of governance. At the same time, the inclusion of figures tied to the NCP and Islamist networks underscores the resilience of Sudan’s old regime. Together, these dynamics suggest that Idriss’s cabinet is less a technocratic experiment than a fragile coalition of military and political elites, with little capacity to address Sudan’s structural crises or advance meaningful reform.

Tasis Struggles to form a new government in Darfur

Tasis, the political alliance of the RSF, the SPLM-N Al Hilu faction, and others formed in February, announced a new government based in Darfur on July 26. The group appointed RSF commander Hemedti as president, overseeing a 15-member presidential council. Abdelaziz al-Hilu of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army – North (SPLA-North) serves as his deputy; Mohamed Hassan al-Ta’aishi is prime minister. The coalition also includes armed movements and parties aligned with RSF who broke away from the civilian Taqqadum coalition. The RSF has 47% of posts of the Presidential Council and the SPLM has roughly one-third, with smaller armed groups rounding out the balance. 

The move appears to be an effort to garner additional legitimacy and to combat the impression that they are nothing more than a militia. Indeed, the timing of the announcement appears to have been tied to the planned, but then cancelled, Quad meeting in Washington. 

However, the Tasis presidential council has yet to be sworn in, and Prime Minister-designate Al Taishi—appointed nearly a month ago—has neither addressed the public nor named a cabinet, leaving the government nonexistent and, by extension, nonfunctional. These delays highlight the RSF and Tasis leadership’s neglect of governance in areas under RSF control, where millions urgently need functioning public health, education, trade regulation, sustainable livelihoods, civilian protection, and other types of relief. After nearly twenty-eight months of conflict, the RSF appears to have abandoned even the pretense of providing for civilians in its territories.

The government in Port Sudan rejected the establishment of the new Tasis government, calling it a “phantom government” and filed lawsuits against 17 leaders of Tasis accusing them of war crimes relating to attacks on civilians in El Fasher, Kadugli and Dilling. The African Union and several governments denounced the Tasis government as posing an increased risk of deepening Sudan’s fragmentation. The UN Security Council expressed “grave concern about the implications of such actions which represent a direct threat to Sudan’s territorial integrity and unity” in a press statement on August 13.

The Somoud civilian movement seeks legitimacy amid splits

The Civil Democratic Alliance for Revolutionary Forces (Somoud) has also been seeking international recognition, travelling to South Africa to meet with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and meeting with other key leaders. They have called for the National Congress Party to be declared a terrorist organization.

The emergence of Somoud after a split in the Taqaddum coalition was accompanied with internal leadership challenges, including in fairly allocating leadership positions among its different political, civil society, and union constituencies. The SPLM-Revolutionary Democratic Current (SPLM-RDC) temporarily suspended its membership in Somoud’s executive bodies, and demanded better mechanisms for political dialogue within the coalition. According to its leader Yaser Arman, in response to an STPT query, the SPLM-RDC is satisfied that its concerns have been resolved and will accordingly resume its full membership in the alliance.

3. Humanitarian developments 

Food riots grip Kadugli under risk of famine

On July 22, 2025, Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan, Sudan, was hit by hunger riots. Inhabitants stormed the market and broke into storage facilities where traders hoarded sorghum grains to manipulate prices. Credible reports emerged that some SAF’s senior commanders colluded with traders to hoard sorghum and sell diesel at double the prevailing prices. This unrest followed protests by women’s groups on July 20, carrying banners that read “Kadugli is Dying,” and chanting slogans denouncing the high cost of living.

Two local militias reportedly aligned with the SAF protected the rioters, causing the army to withdraw to avoid direct confrontation. Kadugli is currently under siege, with road access to the town blocked by the RSF and allied SPLM-N Al Hilu faction.

The humanitarian situation in Kadugli and across South Kordofan is dire. The region has been experiencing severe food shortages due to ongoing conflict, which has disrupted supply lines and agricultural production. Aid organizations report that access to many areas, especially those under siege or with shifting frontlines, is severely limited. A recent assessment in Kadugli indicated that a vast majority of displaced families cannot meet their basic needs, and a significant number of children are malnourished. The UN and other aid agencies have warned of widespread hunger and a risk of famine in various parts of Sudan, including South Kordofan, with the situation expected to worsen during the lean season.

USAID cuts worsen the humanitarian situation in Sudan

Cuts to USAID are worsening the already dire humanitarian situation. The Lancet estimates that 14 million people will die by 2030 if the cuts are maintained.

Soup kitchen volunteers are working to keep their neighbors fed, as food is disappearing, medical supplies which were supposed to be delivered at the start of the year have not been, leaving doctors unable to even dispense antibiotics.

MSF workers in Tine say that the impact of the cuts can be seen in the increasing rate of malnutrition among refugees arriving from Sudan and also in the lack of supplies in the camps in Chad. Humanitarian standards say that the population of 18,000 people should have 350 toilets, but they have only nine.

The hits have not just been on the financial side. As pointed out by Anne Applebaum and Lyndsey Addario, the cuts also hurt logistics and statistics and record keeping. Humanitarian providers, they say, would suddenly find that their trucking company didn’t exist anymore or that the website that they relied on for information was shut down. Justin Lynch of Conflict Insight Group, also points to the lack of technical expertise by US officials as blocking efforts to overcome access challenges.

Cholera rages in Sudan amid collapse of the health system

Cholera is continuing to ravish Sudan. By the end of July, there had been more than 94,000 cases and at least 2,370 deaths across 17 of Sudan’s 18 states. More than 40 people died in a single week in August. The outbreak is particularly dire in Darfur, where much of the population is already malnourished and therefore weak and the limited access to clean water and overcrowding in displacement camps provides the disease an ideal environment to spread. For example, in Tawila, displaced persons have no choice but to gather water from natural sources and shallow wells that are likely contaminated. More than 1,500 cases have been treated in the town already. Other

Throughout Darfur, there have been more than 2,000 cases and 80 deaths, according to the UN. The IDP coordination body reports that in fact 4,377 have been infected and 73 killed. 75 additional cases were reported in a single day in August.

The epidemic has extended to several regions in Jebel Marra, notably Golo, Guldo, and Nertiti. The total cumulative cases in Kalma camp reached 435, comprising 58 fatalities. The total cumulative cases in Atash camp reached 202, with 50 fatalities. The total cumulative count in Dereig camp has reached 117, comprising four fatalities. This is supplementary to the cases documented in Al Salam camp.

The collapsing health care system is likely to exacerbate the death toll by removing critical care. The ongoing violence inhibits access to care and to medicines.

Attacks on humanitarians continue

On Wednesday, August 20, an aid convoy operated by the World Food Program was attacked near the town of Mellit in North Darfur. The area is affected by famine and in desperate need of the aid being transported. The RSF, which controls the town, accused the SAF of responsibility, a charge which the army has denied. The attack was condemned by the United States.

This was only the latest incident in a series of attacks on humanitarian workers. Several workers were killed in El Fasher in June. According to Insecurity Insight, there have been at least 631 incidents of obstruction of access against health care workers, including 160 killings of health care workers since the conflict began. 66% of the incidents were attributed to the RSF. 160 killings of health care workers since the conflict began. 66% of the incidents were attributed to the RSF.

4. Human rights

The Emergency Lawyers warn of abuses by “security cell”

The Emergency Lawyers warn that “security cell” forces are escalating their campaign of retribution towards suspected RSF members. The lawyers have documented an increasing number of arbitrary detentions, torture, and killings of suspected RSF collaborators, often based on their ethnicity.

Sudanese refugees attacked at Kiryandongo camp in Uganda

An estimated 64 Sudanese refugees were injured and one was killed reportedly at the hands of South Sudanese gangs in Kiryandongo camp in Uganda. These attacks appear to have targeted Sudanese on the basis of their nationality and built on increasing tensions between Sudanese refugees and the majority Nuer South Sudanese refugees. In the run up to the violence, tensions had reportedly caused Sudanese to skip school for fear of harassment. The Sudanese Doctor’s Network has warned since May that conditions in the camp for the approximately 50,000 Sudanese refugees have worsened with malnutrition increasing and access to basic health care decreasing amid cuts to WFP and UNHCR. The lack of official response has reportedly increased fear and led to calls for the resettlement of affected refugees.

Civilians massacred in North Kordofan

Following a massacre in Shaq El Noum in North Kordofan which claimed between 60 and 450 lives, Volker Turk UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called for the investigation of the incidents and accountability for those responsible. The Yale Humanitarian Research Lab corroborated reports of the massacres, saying that high resolution satellite imagery shows extensive destruction consistent with intentional burning of select areas. 675 households reportedly fled as a result of the attack. The town is a strategic entryway to El Obeid. 

UN-designated expert on human rights in Sudan visits Port Sudan

The UN-designated expert on human rights in Sudan, Radhouane Nouicer, visited Port Sudan from July 27 to 31. At the end of the visit, he highlighted ongoing human rights concerns in the country, including threats to civilians in El Fasher and Kordofan, sexual violence, and hate speech. He also welcomed reports from the Attorney General that 1200 cases have been filed by the National Committee for Investigating Crimes and Violations of National Law and the Attorney General has removed the immunity of 300 members of the SAF under International Humanitarian Law.

The Sudan Rights Network welcomed the effort but expressed concern that visiting only Port Sudan and not other areas could result in a biased view of the conflict.

Sudan sides with Eritrea at the Human Rights Council

Sudan was one of only four countries that voted in favor of a motion made by the government of Eritrea to end the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Eritrea in the UN Human Rights Council on July 4. Instead, a competing motion submitted by the European Union to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Eritrea by a year passed.

Port Sudan authorities block WhatsApp Calls

On July 25, the Port Sudan authorities blocked voice and video calls on WhatsApp, citing security concerns. The move was widely condemned by rights activists, who argued that it was less about security and more about control, pointing out that the lack of access to information was already a serious concern in Sudan. Others called for the need to protect the right to communication in the context of war. The service appears to still work with a VPN. Affected individuals are finding a number of workarounds like using Starlinks, using other communications platforms and Starlink connections. Some of these, however, are costly.

Use of child soldiers widespread in Sudan’s war

A new report and video by Ayin and Sudan Human Rights Hub gathers testimonies & evidence that both the Sudanese army & RSF have recruited children, some as spies, others in exchange for money or protection, deepening the toll of Sudan’s conflict. According to one Rapid Support Forces (RSF) soldier, child recruitment has always been part of the RSF, but never to this current scale. The full documentary is available here.

The SHRH released a comprehensive report analyzing human right violations between April 2023 and June 2025

The Sudan Human Rights Hub (SHRH) also released a comprehensive report on international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) violations in Sudan from April 2023 to June 2025. Research was based on the SHRH archive of open-source information including more than 35,000 documents, satellite images and eyewitness testimonies of abuses by both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

The research shows systematic patterns of abuse, such as extrajudicial killings, mass graves (such as at Al Salha detention centre), torture, enforced disappearances, indiscriminate attacks on civilian infrastructure (including Port Sudan International Airport and Halfaya Bridge), destruction of vital services, forced recruitment, and sexual and gender-based violence. Many of these violations qualify as war crimes or crimes against humanity.

The report describes how the RSF used Abu Siad School as a prison and execution site, subjecting captives to torture and burying bodies in unmarked mass graves. It also shows that the RSF attack on Port Sudan International Airport included drone attacks that inflicted damage on civilian hangars, fuel depots, and humanitarian assistance warehouses, in apparent violation of international humanitarian law principles of distinction and proportionality. The evidence also showed that supporters of both SAF and RSF attacked Halfaya Bridge, partly destroying it and causing civilian casualties, also in violation of international law principles. 

The report calls for prompt measures to improve civilian safety and ensure unimpeded humanitarian access. In addition, it advocates victim-centered accountability initiatives to guarantee access to justice, protection, and restitution for survivors and their families. Such initiatives could make use of open-source information and satellite imagery as evidence. Ultimately, sustained and augmented financial and technical support should be directed to groups such as SHRH that engage in comprehensive and impartial documentation and verification of violations.

5. Economic developments

Faced with devastating conditions in Sudan, Sudanese companies expand beyond borders

Months of relentless artillery duels and aerial and drone strikes exchanged between the SAF and RSF during their reckless battle for Khartoum — once home to a disproportionate share of Sudan’s industrial and commercial assets — have devastated much of that infrastructure. Many of the assets that survived direct bombardment were subsequently ravaged by widespread looting and arson, often at the hands of RSF fighters and impoverished urban mobs.

Yet, amid this bleak landscape, a silver lining has emerged: several of Sudan’s largest private sector enterprises, which had maintained business operations abroad, have managed not only to survive but to expand across Africa and beyond.

In July, the Elnefeidi Group — one of Sudan’s largest family-owned conglomerates — sought approval for a $17 million financing facility from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to support its wheat import and milling operations in Cameroon. Meanwhile, Sudanese-Emirati firm Invictus Co., backed by DAL Group (owned by the Daoud family) and Emirati investors, expanded its footprint in the African agricultural trade, gaining ground in the wheat and fertilizer markets of Morocco, Mozambique, and Angola.

6. International responses

The US takes the lead as the Quad fails to meet on Sudan

In late July, the US announced plans to convene a Quad ministerial (US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE) to finalize a framework for peace in Sudan. The effort faltered as consensus among the four principals on a Quad’s on a joint position reportedly proved difficult to garner, leading to the postponement of the meeting. Despite the delay, the announcement generated intense debate on Sudan’s war and possible pathways toward peace. On August 12, US Special Envoy Massad Boulos held a meeting with SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Switzerland. Although intended to remain undisclosed, the meeting leaked in Sudanese and international media, sparking speculation and varied reactions.

Sources indicate the envoy presented Burhan with a plan aimed at:

• Immediate humanitarian ceasefire as an entry point to broader negotiations.
• Scaled-up humanitarian operations, with de facto authorities held accountable for ensuring safe, unfettered aid access.
• Civilian protection commitments require SAF and RSF to end indiscriminate attacks and adopt measures to safeguard civilians.
• Facilitation of displaced persons’ return to home areas.

The US is reportedly engaging RSF leaders to secure their endorsement of a document outlining these commitments in parallel with discussions with SAF. However, reports that RSF commander Hemedti traveled to Switzerland for talks proved inaccurate. Notably, next steps beyond a humanitarian ceasefire remain undefined.

The US shift to bilateral engagement reflects deadlock within the Quad. In particular, Egypt insists that SAF be recognized as Sudan’s sole legitimate authority and dominate post-war governance. The UAE counters that both SAF and RSF should be sidelined in favor of a civilian-led transition, an outcome that the US favors. Saudi Arabia remains closer to the Egyptian position. The polarized positions aired by regional actors during the UK-hosted Sudan meeting in April 2025, which led to the failure to issue a joint statement among all participants, risked paralyzing the Quad before formal mediation could begin. Washington’s direct intervention thus sought to jumpstart a process that regional actors could not agree upon.

Civil society and political actors cautiously welcomed the move, emphasizing the urgent need for a ceasefire but criticizing the exclusion of civilians from the framework. Outreach to figures such as former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok has been limited, fueling concerns about the exclusion of civilians from the process. Commentators stressed that any sustainable settlement must be Sudanese-led, with one noting: “only Sudanese can save Sudan.” Some suggested that in the right framework a Quad-negotiated ceasefire could create space for such a locally owned solution, but only if the framework allows for it. Islamist hardliners condemned Burhan’s apparent willingness to consider an end to a war they had helped instigate, fearing the proposed solutions could block their return to power.

Experts highlight serious concerns about the US capacity to operationalize a humanitarian surge. The dismantling of USAID and downsizing of the State Department’s Sudan expertise leave Washington poorly positioned to manage large-scale aid logistics. Effective operations would require rebuilding teams of experienced former and current AID staff to handle distribution hubs, local logistics, monitoring systems, and safeguards against diversion or misappropriation by warring parties.

A new reflection of Gulf engagement in Sudan

A new report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies offers an overview of Gulf engagement in East Africa. The Center estimates that the UAE has made a total of 21.9 billion in investments in Sudan, with 10.2 being invested in agriculture. This is the vast majority of the estimated 24 billion in Gulf investments. Although the UAE is widely seen as a backer of the RSF, it has many large investments in SAF controlled areas, for example it agreed to invest 5 billion in the Abu Amama Port on the Red Sea, about 200 miles north of Port Sudan. The SAF-backed government annulled the agreement after the war.

EU sanctions on Sudan

The EU Council adopted its fourth package of restrictive measures, including asset freezes and travel bans, in July 2025, targeting two businesses, Alkhaleej Bank and Red Rock Mining Company, and two individuals Abu Aqla Mohamed Kaikal and Hussein Barsham.

Red Rock is a mining company involved in funding and producing weapons for the SAF. Abu Aqla Mohamed Kaikal is a SAF commander who previously fought with the RSF and is being sanctioned for his role in targeting civilians as RSF governor of Gezira. Alkhaleej Bank is largely owned by RSF companies and plays an important role in financing RSF operations. Hussein Barsham has played a key role in RSF violations in Darfur.

The Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted by denouncing the sanctions as without legal basis and presenting the army as engaging in legitimate action in defense of the state against rebellion.